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A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendant/Appellant was entitled to suppression of the 
evidence, pursuant to his Motion and hearing. 
2. Defendant/Appellant was entitled to disclosure of the 
confidential informant, pursuant to common law and the reasons 
for non-disclosure do not exist. 
3. A mandate for in camera proceedings under certain 
circumstances is a necessary compromise that should be recognized 
in this case and in this state. 
B. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS DEFECTIVE, THE ISSUES WERE PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT, AND THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSED THE 
SEIZED EVIDENCE. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent claims that the issue of admission 
of evidence at trial was not properly before this Court. 
Plaintiff cites State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), for the 
proposition that Defendant had a duty to object at trial, even 
though Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine prior to trial. 
This Court should note that the State v. Lesley case should not 
be applied in the present case. Lesley was decided by a divided 
Court. Justices Howe and Stewart held that Defendant had not 
provided the Supreme Court with a record by which they could 
review the ruling. Justices Durham, Hall, and Oakes held that 
the issue had not been preserved for appeal on the basis that a 
trial objection to the admission of evidence was not made. Such 
an objection is obviously not necessary in all cases. 
Justice Durham, writing for the divided Court, held: 
The reasons for such a rule are well illustrated 
in this case. The judge who heard the Motion to 
Suppress was not the trial judge, and there Is no 
indication in the record before us that an evidentiary 
hearing on the Motion was conducted. There are no 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or any written 
ruling with respect to the Appellant's Motion to 
Suppress. . .the trial judge is likely to have a more 
complete view of the grounds for excluding or admit-
ting certain evidence. When a defense counsel fails 
to call the trial judge's attention to any problems 
regarding the admlssability of evidence at the time it 
is offered, he or she deprives the trial judge of an 
opportunity to avoid error in the trial which may have 
been created by an improper ruling on a pre-trial 
Motion, based on inadequate information. In this 
case, the trial judge admitted the disputed evidence 
without any notice of the Defendant's claims that it 
was inadmissible. 
Id., at 82. 
None of the reasons cited by the Court are present in this 
case. The judge who heard the Motion was, in fact, the trial 
judge, and the Court has before It the entire record of the 
evidentiary hearing on the Motion that was conducted. The Court 
does have Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the written 
Ruling and Order, with respect to the Appellant's Motion to 
Suppress, the same is attached to Appellant's Brief. The 
evidence submitted to the Court at the suppression hearing was 
virtually identical to the evidence that was presented at the 
time of trial. Therefore, the grounds for excluding or admitting 
evidence were exactly the same, both at the suppression hearing 
and at the trial. The trial court, at the time that it denied 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, had determined and concluded that 
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the evidence was admissible at the time of trial. Therefore, to 
impose some fictional requirement upon Defendant to raise a 
fruitless objection in light of its prejudicial effect before a 
jury is a technicality that runs contrary to all reasons set 
forth in the Lesley case. 
The Defendant/Appellant largely agrees with the case law as 
cited to this Court by the Plaintiff/Respondent in this case. 
However, the Court should note that the cases cited and relied 
upon by the Plaintiff, all of which uphold Search Warrant 
issuance, contain the information that Defendant/Appellant claims 
should be contained in an Affidavit in Support of a Search 
Warrant. 
In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984), the Search 
Warrant was issued upon a citizen informants tip. Appellant has 
previously provided to the Court both the law and rationale for 
the different treatment of citizen informant tips and criminal 
Informant tips. In Bailey, the informant told the police that 
Defendant had shown to him and offered to sell to him tools and 
car parts. That the Defendant had admitted in the informant's 
presence that Defendant had stolen the tools and parts from a 
store in the vicinity of 3900 South and State Street. The 
informant gave a description of an apartment where he had seen 
the stolen goods. The informant stated that he feared retalia-
tion and asked to remain confidential. Informant stated 
that he considered it his duty as a citizen and wanted to help 
stop burglaries and thefts. No reward or favor was asked. The 
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police checked the informant's record and found that he had no 
felony arrests and was not a suspect in any case. Further, the 
Informant had previously given reliable Information to the police 
regarding stolen vehicles. The police, acting on the informant's 
tip, conducted an independent investigation and verified the 
facts of the burglary, the nature of the stolen property, and the 
description of the apartment. The police also independently 
checked the criminal record of Defendant's friend and found that 
the friend had an extensive record for burglary and auto theft. 
This Court should also recognize that the Affidavit in this case 
was drafted by a seasoned law enforcement officer, well-educated 
in criminal law and criminal procedure, and that the officer, in 
fact, testified that the form had been taken from the 
department's word processing machine. The technical requirement 
of adequate detail should be required under these circumstances. 
The Bailey case well illustrates the law as the 
Defendant/Appellant claims it should be applied. Citizen 
informants require a lesser showing of "veracity." The basis of 
knowledge In the Bailey case is also well established by the 
"wealth of detail" supplied by the Affiant and the independent 
investigation conducted by the police. None of those elements are 
present In the case currently before the Court. 
In addition, Defendant provides to the Court that the 
Affidavit contained many fatal misstatements. In opposition to 
this position, the Plaintiff/Respondent cites the case of State 
v, Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), which was decided solely on 
the grounds of federal law. In Nielsen, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly held: 
Our decision about what the appropriate remedy 
might be if Nielsen had argued that the officer's 
action violated his rights under Article 1, §14 of the 
Utah Constitution is an open question. This Court has 
not decided whether an Immaterial, intentional mis-
statement in an Affidavit supporting a Warrant re-
quires suppression of the evidence as a matter of Utah 
law, or whether it may give rise to some civil cause 
of action. 
Id., at 193. 
This Court should note that Defendant/Appellant is arguing 
in the instant case that the officer's action did violate his 
rights under Article 1, §14 of the Utah Constitution. With 
regards to the Affidavit in question, this Court should note that 
the officer admitted that paragraph 2 was not true. Paragraph 3, 
with regards to veracity, is totally insufficient on its face. 
The officer also admitted that the informant's observations in 
paragraph 4 were also not true. This Court should note that 
paragraph 4 proposes to be a basis of knowledge statement, and is 
totally insufficient under the existing law. Paragraph 5 of the 
Affidavit does not provide if the information was obtained from 
the CI, obtained by the police, or was an independent 
verification of facts given. Therefore, it is also totally 
Insufficient to be recognized for any purpose. Paragraph 6 is 
inconsequential. Paragraph 7 is false in alleging that 
Defendant/Appellant has been convicted of sales of cocaine. 
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Defendant was charged and acquitted of possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute. Therefore, paragraph 7 is either false or 
inadmissable for any reason. Paragraph 8 implies that the 
Affiant obtained Information from a second confidential informant 
that he admitted at the suppression hearing was not true. He 
later claimed the information was obtained from another police 
officer, and there are no independent verifying factors with 
regards to that paragraph. Also, the "attache case" was found 
and searched in this case and In the previous case and never 
contained a handgun, and never contained narcotics, and never 
contained residue of narcotics. The remainder of the allegations 
in the Affidavit are inconsequential. 
Therefore, if this Court follows the implication of the 
State v. Nielsen case, the Court would strike from the Affidavit 
paragraphs 2,4, 7, and 8, and the remainder of the Affidavit 
standing on its own would be insufficient to supply probable 
cause. Furthermore, on its face the Affidavit is Insufficient 
under a totality of the circumstances test, as provided in 
Appellant's Brief. 
The Respondent favorably cites from the case of State v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). Again, Defendant/Appellant 
agrees that an Affidavit must contain "sufficient personal 
observations that the Informant was credible or his Information 
reliable." In Romero, the CI worked for Defendant, gave facts of 
being in his home, described the box that contained the papers 
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and the nature of the papers inside. Also, the Affiant was 
present at a deposition where the CI reltterated under oath what 
he had told Affiant. Such testimony could warrant perjury 
charges if proved false. The Court also noted: 
Furthermore, the reliability of the hearsay 
statement was boosted by the detail with which the 
informant described his personal observation at Defen-
dant's home. 
Romero, supra, at 719, quoted from State v. Hansen, 50 
Ut.Adv.Rep. 3. 
Finally, the Plaintiff/Respondent claims that even if 
probable cause with which to issue the Search Warrant was 
missing, the cocaine was still admissable under Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 12(g). In that regard, this Court should note 
that the police Affiant admitted to numerous misstatements in his 
Affidavit. In addition, the entire investigation and search was 
conducted by the same officer. Therefore, no other officer was 
acting in good faith in relying upon its authority. There can be 
no doubt that the admission of the evidence at the time of trial 
was prejudicial to Defendant, as there was no other Independent 
evidence that would support the charge. Also, this Court should 
note that state law cannot be construed in a manner in violation 
of federal constitutional law. The trial court, sue sponte, 
ruled that there may be constitutional problems with Rule 12(g). 
However, he was obliged to follow that law. Therefore, the 
constitutionality of Rule 12(g) is properly before this Court. 
The search and seizure of Defendant, in violation of his 
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constitutional rights, and subsequent prosecution for crime can 
certainly be deemed to be substantial if the violation is found. 
Defendant/Appellant was precluded from establishing actual bad 
faith by the trial court's refusal to grant disclosure of the 
confidential informant as provided below. However, it goes 
against controlling law to provide the investigating police 
officer with immunity based on the investigating officer's own 
misconduct. 
POINT II 
DEPENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISCLOSURE OP THE CI 
The Plaintiff/Respondent argues in this case that there is 
limited privilege against disclosure of an informant's identity 
in order to protect the safety of informants and to preserve the 
continued free flow of information from such persons. The 
decision to provide a Defendant with this information is within 
the discretion of the trial court and requires balancing of the 
Defendant's need for information against the government's 
interest in preserving its confidentiality. 
Let us first begin with an analysis of the factual 
situation. The Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant provides 
that the CI was in Defendant's house within the past 24 hours. 
The police reports in the case provide that the CI was in 
Defendant's house the morning of the arrest. The Defendant 
obtained all of this information the day following the search, or 
within 24 hours of when the informant was allegedly in his house. 
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reasons for denying disclosure had been extinguished or waived by 
the Plaintiff's conduct. Whatever the state was protecting, it 
was not the informant's identity, which would have been known to 
Defendant had the evidence supplied by the police officer been 
truthful. Defendant was therefore deprived of the opportunity to 
put the informant on at the time of trial, so that the jury could 
adequately weigh the credibility of the informant, as well as the 
rest of the witnesses in the case. 
POINT III 
IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS COURT SHOULD MANDATE IN CAMERA 
PROCEEDINGS IN ORDER TO ADEQUATELY BALANCE AND PROTECT THE 
INTERESTS OP BOTH SIDES. 
Due to the confused and often contradictory problems in 
requiring disclosure of confidential informants, some other 
mechanism is necessary for the balancing of interests. The 
interests to be protected include the Defendant's right to due 
process and the right to confront witnesses against him, and the 
state's privilege against the confidential informant's 
disclosure. Those Interests are adequately spelled out in the 
parties' main Briefs. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent seems to acquiesce in the need for 
this Court to develop some workable solution to the problem faced 
daily, both by the state and by criminal defendants in matters 
such as this. 
Defendant/Appellant herein would remind the Court of the 
danger of perjured police testimony in these matters. Certainly, 
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case either did not exist, or that the information given to the 
police officer or the information sworn to by the police officer 
was, in fact, false. Defendant and his sole roommate testified 
within the time constraints as set forth by the police reports 
and Affiant's Affidavit that no such informant was in their house 
and the facts of the Affidavit could not possibly be true. In 
the presence of such evidence, Appellant would insist that some 
judicial mechanism exists for the protection of potentially 
innocent Defendants. 
In addition, the Plaintiff/Respondent maintains that a 
remand may be in order for the purpose of conducting an in camera 
interview. A review of the record will establish that the police 
officer Affiant in this case had repeatedly claimed that 
absolutely under no circumstances would he disclose the name of 
the confidential informant. He did not say he would disclose it 
to the Court, and the prosecutor in the case admitted that it had 
not been disclosed to him, nor had he interviewed the C.I. 
Additionally, contrary to the allegations of Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, Defendant would wish to have the warm body of the 
confidential informant on the witness stand, subject to cross 
examination, and looking the jury squarely in the eye as he 
testified under oath. If the confidential informant is to be 
disclosed, Defendant would request a new trial, as he feels that 
is necessary to comply with his constitutional rights. However, 
a remand and mandate for In camera proceedings would be the 
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establishes that the confidential informant may not exist or gave 
false information to a police officer, or the police officer has 
falsely testified in his hearsay affidavit. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £f ^day of April, 1987. 
7*~t 
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>rney for Defendant/Appellant 
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